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COMMENTS
MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATIONS CAUSE WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS: NEW JERSEY'S LINEUP GUIDELINES
RESTORE HOPE, BUT ARE THEY ENOUGH?

Dori Lynn Yob*

1.

INTRODUCTION

Pause for a moment and consider the story of one of the many
people who have been wrongfully convicted of a crime that they did
not commit.' In 1984, a man broke into a young college student's
apartment, held a knife to her throat, and raped her.' Shortly thereafter,
she went to the police station and identified the man who she believed
was her assailant, through the use of a photo lineup. She later picked
the same man out of a live lineup and identified him as her attacker at
his criminal trial in 1985. 4 She stated that she was "absolutely,
positively, without-a-doubt certain he was the man who raped [her]
when [she] got on that witness stand and testified against him. ' '5 She
was wrong. Nine years later, a DNA test proved that the man was
innocent.6 During her testimony at the trial of the man that she
believed was her attacker, she was presented with a picture of the man
who turned out 7 to be her actual attacker and she swore that she had
never seen him.
* Comment Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Vol. 43. J.D. Candidate, Santa Clara
University; B.A., B. S., Arizona State University.
1.The story used in the introduction is the true story of Ronald Cotton. See Mark
Hansen, Scoping out Eyewitness IDs, A.B.A. J., April 2001, at 39.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 39.
7. See id. Cotton was granted a new trial where evidence was presented that a man
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The criminal justice system is replete with stories of wrongful
convictions, similar to the one above. In 1992, Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld founded The Innocence Project at Benjamin Cardozo School
of Law in New York to assist individuals who have been wrongful
convicted.8 The New York Innocence Project announced that as of
January 19, 2002, supervised law students have assisted in cases that
have led to 100 exonerations. 9 Mistaken eyewitness identifications
were a major cause in sixty of the first eighty-two DNA exonerations
handled by the Innocence Project in New York.10

The Northern California Innocence Project located at Santa Clara
University School of Law is part of the National Innocence Network.
Kathleen Ridolfi, Director of the Northern California Innocence Project
says, "what is important about Innocence Project cases is not whether
DNA was tested, but what innocence cases are telling us about
problems within our criminal justice system."" These exonerations
have led to a growing awareness that there is a real risk in the criminal
justice system that innocent people will be convicted and sentenced.

How could the eyewitness in this story, and others like her, be so
sure, yet so wrong? Studies have shown that eyewitness identification
evidence is one of the least reliable forms of evidence. Yet, it is among
the most persuasive to juries.' 2 It is difficult for sympathetic juries not
to put significant weight on concrete identifications by victims like the
one above. Jurors are not alone; studies show that judges, attorneys,
and laymen alike believe that eyewitness identifications are a reliable

had told other prisoners that "he had committed the rape for which Cotton had been
convicted". Id.The man took the stand and denied his involvement in the rape. It was at

this time that Thompson testified that she had never seen this man before, although he
proved to be the actual perpetrator. Id.
8. See Innocence Project Website, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org (last

visited January 19, 2002). The Innocence Project is located in New York at Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law. Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld created the project in 1992. Since
its inception in 1992, twenty-eight states have developed similar projects. The Innocence
Project in New York exclusively handles cases in which biological evidence still exists that
can be subjected to DNA testing and can prove actual innocence. Id.
9. See id
10. See id.
11. Dori Yob, SCU Innocence Project Gets First Exoneration, THE ADVOCATE,

February 2002, at 1.
12. See Gary Wells et al., Eyewitness IdentificationProcedures: Recommendationsfor
Lineups and Photospreads,22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 620 (1998).
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form of evidence. 13 This mistaken belief is troubling for one important
reason-errors in eyewitness identifications have proven to be the
leading cause of wrongful convictions in Great Britain and North
America. 14
Despite troubling statistics from DNA exonerations, eyewitnesses
continue to play a vital role in the criminal justice system. Eyewitness
evidence is often instrumental in "identifying, charging, and ultimately
convicting suspected criminals."' 15 Thus, it is essential that eyewitness
evidence be as "accurate and reliable" as possible. 16 The official
scientific review paper on recommendations for lineups and
photospreads written by the American Psychology-Law Society
(APLS), "conservatively estimated" that in the United States, 77,000
defendants based on eyewitness
suspects per year become
7
evidence.'
identification
Psychologists have been studying problems with eyewitness
identification for over a century, but until recently, their research has
been to no avail.18 Law enforcement officials are now beginning to
take steps that will help bridge the gap between social science research
and actual law enforcement practice.' 9 Most notably, New Jersey
recently became the first state to implement the changes in police
lineup procedures that psychology researchers have long

13. See Jennifer Davenport et al., Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating
Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 338 (1997) (examining the role of
commonsense knowledge in attorney, judge, and juror evaluations of eyewitness

identification evidence).
14. See Steven M. Smith, Postdictors of Eyewitness Errors: Can False Identifications
be Diagnosedin the Cross-RaceSituation?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 153, 153 (2001).

15. United States Department of Justice Office of Research Programs, Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guidefor Law Enforcement, at iii (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Guide], available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov or http://www.ojp.doj.gov/nij (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
16. See id.

17. Wells et al., supra note 12, at 609.
18. "Professor Borchard's 1932 text, Convicting the Innocent, studied sixty-five cases
of wrongful conviction. Wrote Borchard: 'Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is
an identification of the accused by the victim of a crime of violence. This mistake was
' BARRY
practically alone responsible for twenty-nine of these [sixty-five] convictions ....
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 95 (Signet 2001) (2000).
19. The Department of Justice released Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law

Enforcement in 1999, and in 2001 New Jersey became the first state in the nation to
officially adopt some of the recommendations from the Department of Justice guide. See
Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup

Identification Procedures (April 18, 2001) (Memorandum from John J. Farmer, Attorney
General of the state of New Jersey to all county prosecutors, police chiefs, and law
at
available
Memo]
[hereinafter
chief
executives)
enforcement
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/djc/guides.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
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recommended. 20 On April 18, 2001, New Jersey Attorney General,
John J. Farmer, outlined New Jersey's new lineup procedures in a
memo to every law enforcement agency and county prosecutor in the
state. 2 1 The new lineup procedures "took effect" on October 15,
2001.22
This comment calls attention to potential sources of error in
eyewitness evidence,23 outlines New Jersey's statewide response to
those problems, 24 and argues against a state-by-state response,
proposing the adoption of uniform national guidelines.2 1 Part II
provides a brief synopsis of the problems with eyewitness evidence that
have been identified by over twenty years of social science research
and the recommendations that have resulted. 6 Part II then describes
the Supreme Court's response to these problems 27 and traces the
history of the recommendation for guidelines.2 8 Part II also describes
the guidelines recently adopted by New Jersey.2 9
Part III briefly identifies the problems with incorporating
guidelines through a state-by-state approach.30 Part IV analyses New
Jersey's guidelines in light of social science findings. 31 Finally, Part V
presents a proposal for the adoption of compulsory Miranda-like
national guidelines and suggests a mechanism for education regarding
the problems with eyewitness identification evidence.32

II.BACKGROUND
The unreliable nature of eyewitness identification evidence is
partially explained by the intricate process that occurs within the
human mind.3 3 In their book Actual Innocence, authors Scheck,
Neufeld, and Dwyer suggest, "what happens in front of the eyes is
transformed inside the head, and is refined, revisited, restored, and
20. See Attorney General Guidelines for Preparingand Conducting Photo and Live
Lineup Identification Procedures (April 18, 2001) [hereinafter Guidelines] available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/djc/guides.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2002).
21. See id
22. Mark Hansen, Second Look at the Lineup: New Jersey Hopes to Net Fewer False

Identifications,A.B.A. J., December 2001, at 20.
23. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
24. See discussion infra Part II.E.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. See discussion infra Part II.C.
28. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
29. See discussion infra Part II.E.
30. See discussion infra Part III.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. See discussion infra Part V.
33. See id.
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embellished in a process as perpetual as life itself."34 This "process" is
influenced by many external35 factors, many of which are controllable by
the criminal justice system.
A.

The Human Mind
1. Relative versus Absolute Judgment

Experiments have shown that eyewitnesses are fairly accurate
when the actual perpetrator is present in the lineup, but have difficulty
not selecting someone when the actual perpetrator is not present in the
lineup presented.36 Research in the area of eyewitness identification has
focused on trying to explain this disparity. 37 Researchers have found
that to understand the reason for this problem one must first understand
is governed by a mental process called
that lineup identification
"relative judgment. 3 8
Relative judgment theory explains that when presented with a
group of suspects all at once, known as a simultaneous lineup,
eyewitnesses tend to identify the person who looks most like the
perpetrator relative to the other individuals in the lineup. 39 At first
glance, relative judgment appears to be an acceptable way for an
eyewitness to make an identification. 40 The actual perpetrator should
be the one who, relative to the others, resembles the eyewitness'
memory of the culprit. 41 The problem with this process is that
eyewitnesses select the person who looks most like the perpetrator
regardless of whether the actual perpetrator is in the lineup. 42 An
eyewitness verbalizing his or her decision-making process while
relying upon relative judgment would say something like, "I know it
can't be numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, or 6, so it must be number 3. ' ' 43 This
decision-making process is particularly troubling considering the only
crime committed by the person in position 3 may be that he or she
34. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 18, at 55.
35. See Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological
Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 765, 765-66 (1995).
"In the eyewitness identification research literature, variables that can be controlled by the
justice system and that can influence the accuracy of eyewitnesses are called system
variables." Id. at 766.
36. See id at 769.

37. See id.
38. Id. at613.

39. See id
40. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 768.
41.

See id.

42. See id. at 769.
43. Wells et al., supra note 12, at 615.
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looks more like the actual perpetrator than the other members of the
lineup.
The more desirable method, absolute judgment, is the process by
which an eyewitness compares each lineup member to his or her
memory of the perpetrator and decides one at a time whether each
person in the lineup is the actual perpetrator." The eyewitness using
this process is likely to say something like, "the face just popped out at
me. "545 When an eyewitness uses absolute judgment, he does not
compare the members of the lineup with one another, rather he
compares each member of the lineup with his own memory of the
perpetrator. 46
Researchers have focused on the importance of
formulating procedures that will prompt eyewitnesses to use absolute
instead of relative judgment 7
2. Contaminationof Memory
In order to understand the problems with eyewitness evidence, one
must have a basic understanding of how the human mind remembers a
face, as well as the factors that influence memory. 48 An eyewitness'
ability to accurately identify another person depends on the eyewitness'
ability to perceive, remember, and articulate a particular person or
49
event.
Perhaps more important than understanding how human memory
operates is understanding how memory does not operate. "Human
memory does not operate like a camera, gathering every detail for later
recall exactly the way it was perceived., 50 Rather, memory involves a
process whereby images are altered or reconstructed based on an
individual's experiences, biases, and expectations. 5 1 In order to
reconstruct an event, people unknowingly integrate details that
occurred after the event to fill gaps or replace forgotten information
from that event, "with imagination frequently playing a significant
role. ' 2 The combination of perception and memory may cause

44. See id at 614.
45. Id.at615.
46. See id at614.
47. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 768-69.
48. See Fredrick E. Chemay, Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist
and the Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721 (1985) (discussing the need for
expert testimony because the process of perception, memory and recall are subject to
contamination, which affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications).
49. See id.
50. Id.at 724.
51. See id

52. Id.
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distorted or incorrect recall of an event or identification of a person.
Furthermore, recollection of a face depends on the features of a
particular face, and some are more easily recalled than others, with
race, 54 "uniqueness, and attractiveness playing a role."55 A further
contributor to mistaken identification is the tendency to confuse a
person seen in one situation with a person seen in a different
situation.56 This is often referred to as "unconscious transference."5 7
Unconscious transference often results in mistaken eyewitness
identification and is difficult to detect.58
As these studies indicate, human memory is susceptible to
contamination by a number of internal and external factors. This does
not mean, however, that eyewitness identification evidence is entirely
unreliable. 59 Rather, it means that such evidence is susceptible to
60
contamination even by those within the criminal justice system.
Variables that have the ability to influence the accuracy of eyewitness
identification, but are controllable by the criminal justice system itself,
have been termed "system variables." 6' The methods utilized by the
system to obtain identifications must therefore be designed to limit or
eradicate the likelihood of contamination.62 This is a task that can be
accomplished by identifying and controlling 63such "system variables"
and reducing reliance upon relative judgment.
B.

ControllingSystem Variables and Reducing Relative Judgment

Various experiments have been conducted to demonstrate how the
64
relative judgment process operates to cause false identifications.
These experiments have helped researchers identify system variables
that can be controlled, resulting in procedures that will help decrease
the number of false identifications in the criminal justice system.65 The

53. See id
54. See Siegfried L. Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect: Beyond Recognition of Faces in
the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170 (2001) (discussing the differences in
accuracy rates for recognizing faces of one's own ethnic group versus recognizing faces in

an ethnic group different from one's own).
55. Chemay, supra note 48, at 729.
56. See id.

57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See Wells & Seelau, supranote 35, at 766.
60. See id

61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.at 769.
65. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 768.
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next five subsections outline the recommendations that have resulted
from the study of: (1) the effect of instructing the eyewitness that the
actual culprit may not be in the lineup, 66 (2) the effect of manipulating
the similarity of lineup participants,67 (3) police behaviors and their
effects on eyewitness confidence, 68 (4) patterns of eyewitness
responses using the dual lineup procedure; 69 and (5) the accuracy of
eyewitness identification using the sequential presentation procedure. 0
1. Instructingthe Eyewitness That the Culprit "May Or May Not
Be Present"
An "instruction-biased lineup" is one in which the eyewitness is
not explicitly told that the culprit may not be in the lineup. 7'
Researchers have suggested that instructing an eyewitness that the
actual perpetrator may not be present in a lineup should encourage the
eyewitness not to merely make a relative judgment. 72 In one study,
eyewitnesses were not given an instruction that the actual perpetrator
might not be present in the lineup. 73 Not giving the instruction resulted
in 78% of the eyewitnesses attempting to make an identification in a
culprit-absent lineup.7 4 When the instruction was given, only 33% of
the eyewitnesses attempted identification in a culprit-absent lineup.75
This may cause concern that the eyewitness will be less willing to
identify someone in a culprit-present lineup.76 However, in the same
study, when eyewitnesses were given the instruction, 87% identified
the culprit when he was in the lineup.77 This study demonstrates that
66. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 615.
67. Seeid. at 615-16.
68. See id.at 624-27
69. See id at 616.
70. See id.at616-17.
71. See Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guidefor Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 257 (2000).
72. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 769.
73. See id. at 769 citing R.S. Malpass & P.G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482-89 (1981).
74. See id. It is important to note the difference between a culprit-absent lineup and a
blank lineup. A culprit-absent lineup is one in which the actual culprit is not present. A
blank lineup in the other hand is a lineup in which every person in the lineup is known to be
innocent of the offense charged. The result of an identification in a blank lineup is that no
charges are filed. The identification in a culprit-absent lineup may result in false
identification and charges implicating an innocent person. See Wells & Seelau, supra note

35, at 770.
75. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 769, citing R.S. Malpass & P.G. Devine,
Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482-89 (1981).

76. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 769.
77. See id, citing R.S. Malpass & P.G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
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the "may not be present" instruction does not merely reduce eyewitness
willingness to identify someone, rather it helps reduce the use of
relative judgment.7 8
Instruction bias is considered a "system variable" because it can
be controlled by the criminal justice system.79 Simply requiring lineup
administrators to give eyewitnesses the "may or may not be present"
instruction reduces the rate of incorrect identifications in culprit-absent
lineups without reducing accurate identifications in culprit present
lineups. 80
Not giving the instruction, however, may imply to
eyewitnesses that the culprit is in the lineup and their task is to merely
identify that person. 81 Giving this instruction may help reduce the use
of relative judgment by legitimizing the option of not identifying
anyone.82
2. Structure of the Lineup
Distracters, foils, and fillers are common terms for individuals in a
lineup who are known to be innocent of the offense in question. 83 If
distractors are chosen in a way that makes the suspect "unduly stand
out," the lineup is said to be "foil biased., 84 A false identification
occurs when an eyewitness chooses an innocent suspect out of a lineup,
85
and does not occur when an eyewitness mistakenly chooses a foil.
Instructionsand the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482-89 (1981).
78. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 769.
79. See Judges, supra note 71, at 243-44.
80. See Wells et al., supranote 12, at 629.
81. See id. at 630.
82. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 778. Removal without replacement
experiments demonstrate that such instructions alone are far from sufficient to eliminate

relative judgments entirely. In a removal without replacement study reported by Gary Wells
in 1993, eyewitnesses to a staged crime were shown one of two photospreads. In one
photospread, the culprit was present, in the other the culprit was removed and not replaced
with another photo. All eyewitnesses were given the instruction that the actual culprit may
not be present. When the culprit was present 54% selected the culprit and 21% said he was
"not there" with the remainder choosing distractors. If they were making absolute
judgments, the removal of the culprit should have made the 54% who identified the culprit
recognize his absence. However, removal of the culprit raised the "not there" response to
32%. The remaining eyewitnesses selected someone else when the culprit was removed.
This demonstrates that even with the instructions that the actual culprit may not be there,
eyewitnesses make relative judgments. Id. at 770, citing Gary Wells, What Do We Know
About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOL. 553-71 (1993).
83. See Wells & Seelau, supranote 35, at 771.
84. See Judges, supra note 71, at 258. In this comment, "perpetrator" and "culprit" are
terms used to define the person who actually committed the crime. The term "suspect" is
used to define the person police have reason to believe may have committed the crime in
question. The term "foil" is used to describe an individual placed in the lineup who is
known to be innocent of the crime in question.
85. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 771. When a distractor is chosen it is an

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Eyewitnesses are more likely to select an innocent suspect when the
suspect fits the initial description given by the victim and the
distractors do not fit the same description. 86 This pattern occurs
because the suspect stands out from the other members in the lineup,87
thereby increasing the chance of being falsely identified.88 When the
distractors and the suspects all fit the eyewitness' initial descriptions of
the culprit, there is an increased chance that a distractor rather than a
potentially innocent suspect will be chosen.89
The official review paper of the APLS warns that although this
recommendation sounds simple to employ, it is actually one of the
most complex. 90 Distractors should also not be chosen because they
look like the suspect. 9 1 If the distractors bear too close a resemblance
to a suspect, the lineup will eventually be composed of clones, and will
92
interfere with the eyewitness' ability to identify the actual culprit.
Researchers recommend that distractors be chosen based on the
eyewitness' initial descriptions of the culprit, rather
than because they
93
suspect.
the
of
that
to
similar
appearance
have an
However, there are problems that may arise when choosing94
distractors who do fit the eyewitness' initial description of the culprit.
First, a suspect does not always match the verbal description given by
the eyewitness.
If this occurs, it has been recommended that
distractors be chosen based on consideration of both features
mentioned
by the eyewitness and salient features of the police
96
suspect.

error, but it is harmless because the identification of a distractor does not result in charges
being filed whereas the mistaken identification of an innocent suspect does result in charges
being filed. See id.
86. See id
87. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 630.
Perhaps the suspect stands out because s/he is the only one who fits the verbal
description that the eyewitness had given to police earlier, or because the suspect is the
only one dressed in the type of clothes worn by the culprit, or because the suspect's
photo was taken from a different angle than the other photos. See id.
88. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 771.
89. See id

90. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 630.
91. See id. at 632.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id

95. See id. at 632. For example, a suspect may not match the verbal description given
by the eyewitness when the suspect is implicated based on some other evidence like
fingerprints or possession of a crime weapon. See id
96. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 632-33. The APLS paper provides a useful
example. Suppose a witness describes the perpetrator as "a white male, 21-25 years old, a
protruding chin, dark hair, around 165 pounds, and around 5'9" tall." Id.at 627. The
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Second, an eyewitness' description may be so specific that it
becomes difficult to compose an unbiased lineup.9 7 This situation may

occur, for example, when the description includes a distinctive scar or
tattoo.98 When this happens, some researchers suggest that a lineup
should not occur because the description is specific enough that police

should not have difficulty apprehending a suspect who fits the
description.9 9

Others believe if a lineup is conducted, the unique

feature described by the eyewitness00should either be covered up or
created on all other lineup members.'

Third, there may be multiple eyewitnesses who describe the
culprit differently. 01 Researchers recommended that if this occurs,
different lineups should be constructed for each witness because it will
prevent the exposure of all eyewitnesses to the same lineup. 02 If the
lineup is biased, multiple eyewitnesses might choose the same suspect

because he unduly stands out. If more than one eyewitness chooses the
same suspect, the identification3 appears to have higher validity,
10
referred to as "correlated error."'
Fourth, there may be some feature of the culprit that the
eyewitness does not describe because they believe it "goes without
saying,"' 0 4 for example, the presence or absence of facial hair.'0 5 A
related problem occurs when a suspect has a particular feature that the
06
eyewitness did not mention in the initial description of the culprit.

suspect shares these features except his chin is receding, not protruding, and he is 32 years
old. Here, paper recommends that the fillers should be "white males, around 32 years old in
appearance with slightly receding chins and dark hair, around 165 pounds, and around 5'9"
tall." Id. at 628.
97. See Judges, supra note 71, at 260.
98. See id.
99. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 634. The rationale for foregoing a lineup when
an eyewitness gives a specific description of unique features is that it is impossible to find a
reasonable set ofdistractors.
[Further], [w]ith a vague description, a lineup provides the witness with an
opportunity to recognize physical characteristics that he or she had been
unable to recall when providing a prelineup description of the culprit. A
recognition memory task (i.e., a lineup) seems unnecessary when an
eyewitness' recall is so complete that he or she describes specific idiosyncratic
physical features of the culprit. Under such circumstances, . . . the police need
only apprehend a suspect who fits the witness' description.
Id. at 628-29.
100. See Judges, supra note 71, at 260.
101. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 634.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Judges, supra note 71, at 260.
105. See Wells, et al., supra note 12, at 633.
106. Seeid
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When either of these problems occur, researchers generally suggest that
investigators take care that the10 lineup
is not constructed in a way that
7
causes the suspect to stand out.
According to the APLS scientific review paper, the neutrality of a
lineup can be tested using "mock witnesses."' 08 Mock witnesses are
people who are not familiar with the culprit.10 9 These people are given
the eyewitness' initial verbal description of the culprit and then shown
the lineup." I0 If the suspect is chosen at a rate higher than chance
expectations based on the number of lineup members, it is likely that
the lineup is biased."'
Another problem caused by a foil-biased lineup is that it
artificially increases eyewitness confidence." 2 When an eyewitness
chooses an innocent suspect who is the only lineup member who fits
the eyewitness' initial description, the eyewitness' confidence is likely
to be greater than if other members of the lineup also fit the
description. 113 The problem with artificially increasing eyewitness
confidence in this way is described below.
3. Confidence Malleability
Studies have shown that many decision-makers in the criminal
justice system rely heavily on a particular eyewitness' confidence as a
gauge of the accuracy of that eyewitness' identification.1 4 However,
research indicates that witness confidence is largely unrelated to
identification accuracy.' 1 5 The reason confidence and accuracy are
unrelated is because confidence is "malleable," meaning it can be16
inflated due to a variety of factors that occur after the identification."
Therefore, an eyewitness' confidence at trial does not necessarily
reflect the accuracy of the identification, but may instead reflect the
influence of post-identification7 factors such as confirming feedback
from the lineup administrator."
107. See id.
at 633-34.
108. See id. at 631.
109. Seeid
110. See id.
111. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 631.
112. See id.
113. See id
114. See Davenport etal., supra note 13. Also note that level of certainty demonstrated
by the witness is one of the five factors that the U.S. Supreme Court has identified as
important when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 199-200 (1972).
115. See Judges, supra note 71, at 265.
116. See Wells, et al., supra note 12, at 624.
117. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 780.

2002]

RETHINKING LINEUP GUIDELINES

A lineup administrator can inflate an eyewitness' confidence by,
for example, providing feedback that a co-witness identified the same
suspect.' 8 This problem is also an example of a "system variable"
because the use of police interview techniques and other factors
controllable by the criminal justice system are the primary reason
confidence is inflated. 19 Studies have also demonstrated how positive
feedback can contaminate the witness' recollection of his or her own
experience with the identification procedure. 20
One study
demonstrated how confirmatory feedback such as:
"Good, you identified the actual suspect in the case," ... yielded
responses from the eyewitnesses indicating greater certainty in the
identification, a better view of the culprit, a greater ability to make
out details of the face, greater attention to the event, a stronger
basis for making the identification, greater willingness to testify,
more trust in an identification made under these conditions, and
121
more details provided in the description.
Other studies have shown that witnesses who are questioned
repeatedly, or briefed about the questions they can expect on crossexamination regarding the identification have increased confidence in
the identification. 122 Studies like these demonstrate how easily a
remark by a lineup administrator can turn an inaccurate eyewitness into
23
a confident witness that jurors are likely to believe.1
Researchers have recommended that in order to decrease the
possibility of contamination, a "double blind procedure" should be
used. 124 This simply means that the person who conducts the lineup
should not know which member of the lineup is the suspect. 25 A
commonly held scientific belief is that "[a] person's assumptions that a
phenomenon will happen leads to behaviors that tend to make the
phenomenon happen.', 126 If a lineup administrator does not know who
the suspect is, he is less likely to unknowingly exert an influence on the
2 7
eyewitness' decision.
Another recommendation is that a statement of the eyewitness'
118. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 635.
119. See Judges, supra note 71, at 266.
120. See id. at 266-67.
121. Id, citing Gary Wells & Amy Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect":
Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 366 (1998).
122. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at page 624-25.
123. See Judges, supra note 71, at 269.
124. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 627.
125. See id.
126. Id.at 627.
127. See id at 629.
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level of confidence in his or her identification should be taken before
28
he or she is given any feedback about the identification.
Determining the eyewitness' level of confidence immediately after the
identification will not allow time for post-identification factors to
influence that level.' 2 9 This procedure is effective because if the
eyewitness expresses a higher level of confidence at trial than he or she
did at the identification, the fact-finder should be aware that any
confidence might be the result of factors other than
increase in
1 30
accuracy.
4. Blank Lineups
Researchers have tried to identify individuals who are prone to
using relative judgment.' 3' The above has been accomplished through
the use of a dual lineup, in which a witness is presented with a blank
lineup-a lineup in which all individuals are known to be innocent of
the offense in question-before being presented with the actual
lineup. 132 The blank lineup operates as a lure to see if the eyewitness
will resist falsely identifying someone. 133 Studies have shown that
eyewitnesses who identify a person in a blank lineup are more likely
34
also to make a false identification in a subsequent actual lineup.'
Perhaps the strongest support for the use of dual lineups is research
showing that dual lineups only minimally reduce the frequency of
accurate identifications.13 The only effect of dual lineup procedures
appears to be reducing the rate of false identifications. 136
5. Sequential versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedures
A sequential lineup procedure requires the eyewitness to view the
lineup members one at a time, making a determination whether or not
each person is the perpetrator before moving on to the remaining lineup
members. 37 This type of lineup is different from the more traditional
''simultaneous lineup," which allows an eyewitness to view all lineup
members at the same time. 3 8 A simultaneous lineup encourages the

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 780.
See id
See id
See id. at 770.
See id.
See id.
See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 770.
See id.
Seeid.
Seeid. at 772.
See id.
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use of relative judgment because witnesses are given the opportunity to
compare the lineup members to
one another, choosing the one who
39
looks most like the perpetrator.'
Conversely, a sequential lineup forces the eyewitness to use
absolute judgment, 140 deciding based on his or her memory whether
each individual is the perpetrator rather than based on relative
judgment.14' When a sequential lineup is used, the eyewitness has not
yet seen the remaining lineup members,
thus, he or she is not in the
42
position to make a relative judgment.1
C.

U.S. Supreme Court Treatment

Researchers have long recommended the adoption of guidelines
that incorporate their findings regarding eyewitness evidence
procedures. 143 As illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
eyewitness identification cases, the Court has not been oblivious to the
problems with eyewitness identification procedures. 144 However, to
date, the Court has not provided a standard set of legal rules that every
45
law enforcement investigator must follow when conducting lineups. 1
On June 12, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court announced decisions in
three cases involving problems with eyewitness identification
procedures. 146 These three cases have become known as the "Wade
trilogy.' ' 147 All three of these cases involved lineup practices that the
48
Court recognized as problematic. 1
1. The Wade Trilogy
In United States v. Wade, 149 the Court held that denying the
defendant an attorney during a lineup violates his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 150 However, the Court decided that that even if
139. See id
140. See Wells & Seelau, supranote 35, at 768-69.
141. See id
142. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 617.
143. See id at 609-12.
144. See id. at 609.
145. See id.
146. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
147. See David E. Paseltiner, Twenty Years of Diminishing Protection: A Proposal to
Return to the Wade Trilogy's Standards, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 583 (1987).
148. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 782.

149. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, the defendant was convicted of robbery after being
identified in a lineup at which he was denied counsel. See id.
150. See id.at 241.
In Kirby v. Illinois, only 5 years after Wade, the United States Supreme Court

held that, unless 'adversary judicial proceedings' have been initiated against
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counsel is not present, a subsequent in-court identification is permitted
if the government can establish by "clear and convincing evidence that
the in-court identification [is] based upon observations of the suspect
other than the lineup identification., 15' This became known as the
"independent origin" or "independent source" rule: 152 that an in-court
identification following improper pretrial lineup or show-up will be
permitted only if the prosecution can show that such in-court
identification arises from an independent source."'
The second case in the Wade trilogy, Gilbert v. California,154 also
involved the right to counsel. 155 Gilbert expanded on the Wade
15 6
decision by adding a second prong to the rule announced in Wade.
The second prong provides that testimony based on a lineup during
which counsel is not present is subject to a "per se exclusionary rule"
The Court concluded that the
and will not be permitted. 15
exclusionary rule is the only effective way to "assure that law
right
enforcement authorities will respect the accused's ' constitutional
58
lineup."'
critical
the
at
counsel
his
of
to the presence
Stovall v. Denno 159 is the final case in the Wade trilogy. In
him, an arrested suspect is not entitled to have his lawyer attend a lineup.
Shortly afterward, in U.S. v. Ash, the Court held that there is no sixth
amendment right to counsel at a photographic display, even after indictment.
Neil C. McCabe, The Right to a Lawyer at a Lineup: Support from State Courts and
Experimental Psychology, 22 IND. L. REV. 905, 905 (1989).
151. Wade, 388 U.S. at 240. The factors the court considered in determining if there
was an independent source are:
[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on
a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence
of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
Id. at 241.
152. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967).
153. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
154. 388 U.S. 263 (1967). In Gilbert, the defendant was identified in a lineup that was
conducted in an auditorium and was viewed simultaneously by approximately one hundred
victims of robberies charged to the defendant. The lineup was conducted on a stage, behind
bright lights, preventing those in the lineup from seeing the audience. The defendant's
counsel not present. See id. at 269-70.
155. See id.
156. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
157. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273.
158. Id. at273.
159. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, the defendant was charged with murder. He was
exhibited on the day after the crime, alone and handcuffed, before the only living eyewitness
of the crime. The show-up was conducted in a hospital room because the eyewitness had
been stabbed eleven times and was in the hospital. The defendant's counsel was not present.
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Stovall, the Court held "that suggestive procedures could violate due
process even when the right to counsel does not apply."' 160 There, the
defendant challenged a suggestive lineup based on his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.' 61 The Court held that a
defendant is entitled to relief if the lineup was "so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he
was denied due63process of law"'162 based on the "totality of the
1
circumstances."'
The Wade trilogy thus established that denying counsel to a
defendant appearing in a pre-trial identification constituted a violation
of that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that
suggestive identification procedures could be violative of due
process. 164
However, Simmons v. United States165 marked the
beginning of the dismantling of the Wade trilogy and its protections. 6 6
2.

The Demise of the Wade Trilogy

In Simmons, 167 the Court rephrased the Stovall168 standard in a

way that weakened a defendant's right to due process in a lineup.

69

See id.

160. Wells & Seelau, supra note 35, at 783. Although the right to counsel at certain
pretrial identification procedures was announced the same day in Wade and Gilbert, the
Court held that the right should not apply retroactively. Therefore, in Stovall, the Court held
that the defendant's right to counsel was not violated. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg,
Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection with PretrialIdentificationProcedures:
An Analysis anda Proposal,79 Ky. L.J. 259, 263-64 (1990-1991).

161. Stovall, 388 U.S. 293.
162. Id.at 302. The Court ruled that while the show-up in Stovall was suggestive, it was
not "unnecessarily suggestive." Wells & Seelau, supranote 35, at 783.
163. Id.The Court announced the "totality" standard without stating the factors that
should be used, although, the Court looked only to factors surrounding the identification.
See Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 588.
164. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
165. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons, the defendant was charged with robbery. On the
day following the robbery, FBI agents obtained several photos of the suspect from his sister.
The FBI agents then took the photos to the bank employees who witnessed the robbery at
their place of work. Each witness was shown the photos separately, and all of them
identified the defendant. At later dates, some of these witnesses were re-interviewed by FBI
agents and shown indeterminate numbers of photos, and again identified the defendant. At
trial, the Government did not introduce any of the photos, but relied on in-court
identifications of the defendant by the witnesses. The court upheld the robbery conviction
even though the in-court witnesses had been shown photos of the defendant before trial in
suggestive circumstances that might have tainted the in-court identifications. See id.
at 382.
166. See Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 589.
167. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
168. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
169. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection
with PretrialIdentificationProcedures:An Analysis anda Proposal,79 KY. L.J. 259 at 268
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The Simmons Court held that a lineup identification would be set aside
only if it was "so impermissibly suggestive as to give
rise to a very
' 70
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."'
The next two pretrial identification cases decided by the Court
were Neil v. Biggers171 and Mason v. Brathwaite.172 These two cases

are known as the cases that completed the demise of the Wade trilogy
protections. 173 Biggers and Brathwaite established that the right to due
process focuses on 7the
reliability of eyewitness identifications, not
4
1
fairness.
procedural
In Neil v. Biggers,175 the Court held that due process requires the
exclusion of a pretrial identification only if the identification is
suggestive 7 6 and unreliable. 177 In other words, even if a pretrial
(1990-1991).
170. 390 U.S. at 384.
171. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The defendant in Biggers was convicted of rape based on
evidence that consisted primarily of a station-house showup that occurred seven months
after the rape. The police suggested that they used the suggestive showup technique because
they had difficulty finding others who matched the victims initial description. See id.at 188.
The Court held there was not a "substantial likelihood of misidentification." Id. at 201.
172. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). The defendant in Brathwaite was convicted of possession and
sale of heroin. Glover, an undercover police officer went to an apartment building on a tip
from an informant to try to purchase narcotics from a known dealer. Glover knocked at the
door of one of the apartments. The area was illuminated by natural light from a window.
The door was opened twelve to eighteen inches. Glover observed a man standing behind a
woman at the door. Glover requested the drugs, the man at the door put out his hand, and
Glover gave him the money before the man closed the door. The man soon returned and
handed Glover the heroin. When Glover returned to the police station he described the
seller as "a colored man, approximately five feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black
hair, short Afro style, and having high cheekbones, and of heavy build. He was wearing at
the time blue pants and a plaid shirt." Id. at 101. Another officer obtained a photo of
defendant from the Records office and left it on Glover's desk. Later, while alone, Glover
viewed the photo, and identified the man in the photo as the person from whom he
purchased drugs. At the defendant's trial, the photo was received into evidence without
objection and Glover testified that even though eight months had passed he was sure the
person in the photo was the defendant. See id at 99-102. After applying the Biggers
factors, the Court held that under all the circumstances of the case there was not a "very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Id. at 116.
173. See Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 590.
174. See Rosenberg, supra note 169, at 272.
175. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
176. One commentator remarked:
While suggestive confrontations are "disapproved" and unnecessarily
suggestive ones are "condemned," the Court held that they nevertheless may
be admissible if the identification was reliable. In other words, police
misconduct will be tolerated as long as it does not affect reliability. The focus
thus moves away from what the police did wrong (suggestiveness) to what is
left after discounting police errors (reliability). As a result, the defendants
rights are further diminished, and the Gilbert sanctions which were designed
to protect the defendant's interests, have been effectively reduced.
Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 591.
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identification is suggestive, it does not violate due process if it is
reliable.178 The Court indicated that whether a pretrial identification is
reliable depends on a "totality of the circumstances" test. 179 The Court
identified five factors to be considered in applying that test: (1) the
opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated
and; (5) the length of time between
by the witness at the confrontation
80
confrontation.
the
and
crime
the
Mason v. Brathwaite181 completed the demise of the Wade trilogy
and provides the standard used today in federal courts. 8 2 The
Brathwaite Court held that "reliability is the linchpin in determining
the admissibility of identification testimony.' ' 183 The Court held that
reliability is to be determined by weighing the Biggers factors against
the "corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself."'' 84 One
commentator remarks, "as a deterrent to suggestive police practices,
the federal standard is quite85weak. Almost any suggestive lineup will
meet reliability standards."
In his dissent, Justice Marshall said "today's decision can come as
no surprise to those who have been watching the Court dismantle the
protections against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected a decade
ago in United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and Stovall v.

Denno."'

86

History of Recommended Guidelines
Legal researchers have been suggesting the adoption of procedural
guidelines since the 1960s. 187 Research psychologists began drafting
and publishing recommended sets of guidelines as early as 1967.188
The most comprehensive set of recommendations to date is contained
D.

177. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99.
178. See Biggers, 409 U.S. 188.
179. Id. at 199.
180. Id. at 199-200.

181. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
182. Seeid.

183. Id. at 114.
184. Id.
185. Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 605.
186. 432 U.S. 98 at 118 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 610. "The earliest set of published
recommendations for line-up identifications is to be found in a 1967 article in the
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW QUARTERLY (Procedure for Line-up Identification, 1967)." Id.
188. See id
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in a 1988 book written by Gary Wells, 189 wherein 131 specific
procedural recommendations are explained. 190
Despite the years of research that social scientists have devoted to
the study of eyewitness identification evidence, experts within the legal
system remained "skeptical." '1 9' One commentator remarked, "the
law's generic skepticism of social science . . . risks deteriorating into a
counterproductive bias if the legal system fails to recognize the genuine
strides that social science has made in recent decades."' 192 Despite
skepticism within the legal system, social science researchers have not
given up on possible reform. 193 Since his 1988 book, Wells and his
colleagues have begun to advocate the adoption of a much shorter list
94
of key recommendations. 1
The nation's highest law enforcement agency, the Department of
Justice, has also begun to advocate change in eyewitness identification
evidence procedures. 95 In June of 1996, the U.S. Department of
Justice's National Institute of Justice (NIJ) released a report entitled
Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of
DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial.196 After reviewing
the report, Attorney General Janet Reno directed the NIJ to further
investigate the problems with the investigations that yielded the
wrongful convictions contained within the report. 197 The obvious place
to start was with the problems caused by eyewitness testimony, which
played a major role in the majority of the twenty-eight cases studied.' 98
In May 1998, the National Institute of Justice initiated a second
study to establish a set of recommendations that would improve the
quality of eyewitness evidence by incorporating accepted scientific
principles and practices. 199 The NIJ put together a Technical Working

189. Gary Wells is a psychology professor at Iowa State University and is a pioneer in
the field of eyewitness identification. Wells helped New Jersey establish its new lineup
guidelines. See Hansen, supra note 22, at 20.
190. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 612.
191. Judges, supra note 71, at 237.
192. Id.
193. See discussion infra Part B. 1-5.
194. See discussion infra Part B.1-5.
195. See Memo, supra note 19.
196. United States Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Convicted by
Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish

Innocence after Trial, (June 1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/dnaevid.txt
(last visited Jan. 19, 2002). The study reviewed twenty-eight cases in which individuals
were wrongfully convicted. See id.
197. See Guide, supra note 15, at 3.
198. See id.
199. See id
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Group for Eyewitness Evidence ("working group").200 This working
group of thirty-four law enforcement, legal, and research experts from
the United States and Canada combined their efforts to create a set of
recommendations that they hoped would increase the reliability of
eyewitness evidence and reduce the predominance of wrongful
convictions. 20 ' This study marked the first time that the American
criminal justice system took formal notice of what social science
researchers have been recommending for years.20 2
The result of this collaborative effort was a handbook released in
1999 entitled Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement
("Guide"). 0 3 Although the Guide does not create an enforceable
protocol, Attorney General Reno suggested that "every jurisdiction
should give careful consideration to the recommendations in [the]
Guide. 20 4 New Jersey appears to have heeded Reno's warning by
adopting many of the Guide's recommendations in their new lineup
procedures.20 5
E.

New Jersey's Guidelines

In 2001, New Jersey became the first state to adopt eyewitness
evidence guidelines statewide.20 6 New Jersey was able to make
statewide change because the state Attorney General has sole control of
all of the state's law enforcement agencies.20 7 The guidelines begin
with a preamble, which states that the guidelines are to be considered
"best practices" to ensure that New Jersey's identification procedures
"minimize the chance of misidentification of a suspect., 20 8 The
guidelines are then broken into two sections: (1) composition of photo
or live lineups; and (2) conducting the identification procedure.20 9
Each section contains multiple subsections outlining the different
procedures to follow when conducting a photo lineup, live lineup,
sequential lineup, or simultaneous lineup. 210 This subsection will
outline the salient features in those various sections.
The guidelines begin with a section on the composition of photo

200. See id
201. See id at 5.
202. See Judges, supra note 71, at 237.
203. See Guide, supra note 15.
204. See Guide, supranote 15 at iii.
205. See Guidelines, supra note 20.
206. See Guidelines, supra note 20.

207. See Hansen, supra note 22, at 21.
208. Guidelines, supra note 20, at 1.
209. See generally Guidelines, supra note 20.
210. See id.
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or live lineups. 211 The section suggests that following the procedures
outlined in the guidelines will result in a lineup in which "the suspect
does not unduly stand out," 212 and appears to be designed to address
213
"foil bias."
The guidelines provide: "whenever practical," the lineup
administrator should be "someone other than the primary investigator
assigned to the case." 214 When this practice is not "practical" and the
primary investigator conducts the lineup, the guidelines warn, "he or
she should be careful to avoid inadvertent signaling to the witness of
the 'correct' response. ,,11 Second, eyewitnesses should be given an
instruction that "the perpetrator may not be among those in the photo
array or live lineup, and therefore, they should not feel compelled to
make an identification., 21 6 Third, "when possible," lineups should be
conducted sequentially. 217 Finally, the lineup administrator should
ensure that the "suspect does not unduly standout." 218 However, the
guidelines note that "complete uniformity of features is not
' 2 19
required.
When composing a lineup, the guidelines suggest that the
administrator select fillers who "fit the witnesses' description of the
perpetrator," but when the suspect's appearance is different than such
description or when such description is inadequate, fillers should
resemble the suspect. 220 When there are multiple eyewitnesses, the
22
guidelines suggest merely placing the suspect in different positions. '
The guidelines also suggest that reusing fillers should be avoided when
lineups are shown to the same witness or when a witness is shown a
new suspect. 222 Finally, the guidelines recommend that when using a
photo lineup, the administrator should view the array to "ensure the
223
suspect does not unduly stand out.
The second section of the guidelines promulgates procedures to be
followed when conducting an identification. 224 This section is divided
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id.

Id.
See discussion infra Part B-2.
Guidelines, supra note 20, at1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at2.
Id.
Guidelines,supra note 20,at2.
See id.at 3.
See id at 2.
Id.
See id.at 3.
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into subsections for simultaneous photo lineups, sequential photo
lineups, simultaneous live lineups, sequential live lineups, and
recording identification results. 225 The following will outline the
notable recommendations from these sections.
The guidelines suggest that the administrator "avoid saying
'226
anything to the witness that may influence the witness' selection.
Further, if the eyewitness makes an identification, the administrator
should "avoid reporting to the witness any information regarding the
individual he or she has selected prior to obtaining the witness'
statement of certainty" and recording the same.227 The guidelines also
remind the administrator to give the eyewitness the instructions
outlined in the first section.22 8 However, the recommendations outline
a set of additional instructions to be given to the witness when a
sequential lineup is used.229 The instructions for a sequential lineup
inform the witness that the photos or individuals will be viewed "one at
a time" in a random order. 230 Additionally, the instructions give
individual departments the option of stopping the lineup procedure as
soon as an identification is made, or alternatively, showing all photos,
even if an identification is made before the witness has seen each
individual or picture.23'
The New Jersey guidelines suggest that simultaneous or sequential
live lineups should be documented by photo or video.2 32 Further, in
both types of live lineups it is recommended that the administrator
"ensure that any identification actions (e.g., speaking, moving, etc.) are
performed by all members of the lineup. 233
Finally, the guidelines recommend that the lineup administrator
should record both "identification and nonidentification results in
writing" including the witness' confidence statement.234 Such results
should be signed and dated by the witness.2 35
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Erroneous eyewitness identification continues to be the leading

225. See id. at 3-7.
226. Guidelines, supranote 20, at 3.

227. Id.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See id,
See id at 4.
Id.
See id.
See Guidelines, supra note 20, at 5, 7.
Id. at 5, 6.
Id. at 7.
See id
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cause of wrongful conviction in the United States.2 36 The main issue
now facing the legal community is how to most effectively transform
scientific research into consistent law enforcement practice. Officials
in the state of New Jersey have taken a proactive approach to the
problem by adopting statewide guidelines.237 The guidelines adopted
by New Jersey are certainly an improvement, but they are far from
ideal.
Although it is too early to tell whether the guidelines will have
any practical impact, there are some problems with a state-by-state
approach that may prevent an optimal return. The primary problem
with the guidelines is that they are "only recommendations, not
mandates. 238 In his memo, the New Jersey District Attorney asked that
"all members of the law enforcement community strive to implement
[the] procedures., 239 Thus, although they have been recommended to
every law enforcement agency in New Jersey, it is not guaranteed that
all agencies will indeed adopt them. Further, it will be difficult for
other states to follow New Jersey's lead because most Attorney
Generals do not have the authority to implement statewide change.24 °
Therefore, a state-by-state approach is a largely ineffective solution to
the nationwide problem of unreliable eyewitness identification.
IV.

ANALYSIS

One reason people rely heavily on eyewitness identification
evidence in criminal trials is because an eyewitness who says "that is
the person who threatened me with the knife" provides direct evidence
of guilt.241 Identifications provide direct evidence by directly linking
the defendant to the criminal act.242 In contrast, fingerprints and other
physical evidence do not provide such a direct link and, hence, only
provide circumstantial evidence.243 Such circumstantial evidence only
indicates that the suspect touched a particular surface at some time,
"perhaps for reasons unrelated to the crime., 244 Despite its seeming
superiority as evidence, direct eyewitness evidence is often
exceedingly unreliable.245
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See Smith, supra note 14, at 153.
See Guidelines,supra note 20.
See Hansen, supranote 22, at 20.
Memo, supra note 19.
See Hansen, supranote 22, at 21.
Wells et al., supranote 12, at 604.
See id
See id
Wells et al., supra note 12, at 604.
See Chemay, supra note 48, at 721.
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Problematic procedures used by police departments in conducting
lineups add to the unreliability of the resulting evidence. The U.S.
Supreme Court has failed to delineate a uniform set of lineup
guidelines to correct these procedures, thus leaving individual states
and local law enforcement agencies with the task of developing their
own standards.246 Without mandatory guidelines, agencies are left with
the discretion to include or exclude various recommendations made by
researchers that would make identifications more reliable. Perhaps one
reason state officials have not initiated change in lineup procedures is
because many of the country's 19,000 law enforcement agencies are
under local, not state control, making statewide change difficult to
implement.2 47 The problems with eyewitness identification evidence
are not likely to be solved without mandatory, national guidelines
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A.

Critiqueof Supreme Court Treatment

The Supreme Court decided several cases dealing with eyewitness
identification evidence; however, the Court repeatedly ruled narrowly
on the issue of the right to counsel, instead of delineating specific
guidelines for lineup procedures. 248 Through its decisions, the Court
also made it more difficult to challenge faulty eyewitness identification
evidence.
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that a defendant is entitled to
relief if the lineup is "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that [the defendant is] denied due
process of law ' 249 based on the "totality of the circumstances.,, 25 0 But
in Simmons v. United States, the Court replaced the phrase "conducive
to irreparable mistaken identification" with "very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification" making it more difficult for defendants
lineups because this new standard requires a higher level
to challenge
1
25

of proof.

In Neil v. Biggers, the Court held that even if a pretrial
identification is suggestive, it does not violate due process if it is

246. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 609.
247. See id.
248. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 609.
249. Id. at 302. The Court ruled that while the show-up in Stovall was suggestive, it was
not "unnecessarily suggestive." Wells & Seelau, supranote 35, at 783.
250. Id. The Court announced the "totality" standard withoutstating the factors that
should be used, although, the Court looked only to factors surrounding the identification.
See Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 588.
251. Paseltiner, supra note 147, at 589.
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reliable.252 Therefore, Biggers "makes it difficult for the defendant to
prove suggestiveness, while at the same time 253
making it easier for the
prosecution to use a suggestive identification.
In Mason v. Brathwaite, the Court relied heavily on the idea that if
the defendant has counsel at the lineup, the attorney will identify and
remedy any suggestive lineup procedures.2 54 This approach assumes
that defense counsel is educated in the identification of problematic
lineup procedures.2 55 A comprehensive review conducted by one
researcher revealed the existence of problematic gaps between what
science has found on the one hand, and attorneys,' judges,' and jurors'
common sense assumptions about eyewitness evidence on the other
hand.256 This "gap" between common sense and scientific knowledge
may close somewhat with the adoption of "sound policies and
practices. 2 57
However, even if attorneys are able to identify suggestive lineup
procedures, in decisions following the Wade trilogy, the Court limited
25 s
the right to counsel to a point where it rarely applies to lineups.
Thus, the Supreme Court's response to the problems with eyewitness
identification has been significantly limited in its reach.
B.

New Jersey's Incorporationof Scientific Recommendations

The New Jersey guidelines incorporate many of the
recommendations contained within the Guide released by the National
Institute of Justice.259 Various researchers have compiled different lists
of suggested recommendations.2 60 The six recommendations that are
most commonly mentioned are: (1) the witness should be instructed
that the actual perpetrator may not be in the lineup; 26' (2) the lineup
should be conducted in a way that a suspect does not unduly stand
out; 262 (3) a confidence statement should be taken from the witness
263
following his or her identification before any feedback is provided;
(4) the lineup administrator should be unaware of who the suspect
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
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265
(5) mock witnesses should be used to test the neutrality of the lineup;
and (6) sequential rather than simultaneous lineups should be used.266
New Jersey has partially adopted many of the six main
recommendations.
However, in many instances, New Jersey's
guidelines are unclear and may result in misapplication of research
findings.

1. Instructing the Witness that the Actual Perpetrator"May or
May Not" Be in the Lineup
The New Jersey guidelines explicitly contain the recommendation
that the witness should be instructed, prior to the lineup, that "the
perpetrator may not be among those in the photo array or live lineup
and, therefore, they should not feel compelled to make an
identification. 2 67 Studies have shown that such instructions reduce the
rate of incorrect identifications when the actual culprit is not in the
lineup, but do not reduce accurate identifications when the culprit is
present.26 8 The instruction is vital to preventing the eyewitness from
assuming that the police have the actual culprit and that they only need
the eyewitness' identification to proceed with charges. 269 In reality,
police need very little evidence to place a suspect in a lineup, therefore
there is a high risk that a police suspect is innocent.270
2. Composing the Lineup in a Way that a Suspect Does not
"Unduly Stand Out"
In the introductory paragraph to the section on composing a photo
or live lineup, the New Jersey guidelines state that the purpose of the
procedures in that section is to ensure that the lineup composition does
not cause a suspect to "unduly stand out. ' 271 However, the guidelines
in that section fall short of incorporating all of the social science
recommendations designed to prevent "foil bias. 272
First, the guidelines state that when selecting fillers for a lineup,
"complete uniformity of features is not required. 273 Although it may
be an issue of semantics, researchers have shown that complete

265.
266.
267.
268.
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272.
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uniformity is not merely "not required," but is not desired.274 Research
has made clear that distractors should be chosen to fit the eyewitness
description of the culprit, rather than to resemble the suspect. 275 The
"fit the description" criteria is used because using "resemblance" as the
criteria may create "undue homogeneity and interfere with the
recognition of the actual culprit." 276 Although the guidelines appear to
be suggesting this precise distinction, more concise wording would
better serve the apparent purpose.
Second, the guidelines suggest that "when there is a limited or
inadequate description of the perpetrator... or when the description of
the perpetrator differs significantly from the appearance of the suspect,
fillers should resemble the suspect in significant features. 277 This
language is also not as clear as it could be. Researchers have suggested
that when the suspect does not match the initial description of the
perpetrator given by the eyewitness, fillers should have a combination
of features from the witness' description of the perpetrator and from
the suspect.278 This is accomplished by selecting fillers who match the
witness' description, except when there are specific differences
between such description and the suspect's appearance. 279 When thr
there
is a difference between the suspect's appearance and the witness'
description, then the suspect's appearance should control for that
feature.280 The APLS paper provides a useful example.28 ' Suppose a
witness describes the perpetrator as "a white male, 21-25 years old, a
protruding chin, dark hair, around 165 pounds, and 5'9" tall. 28 2
Suppose further that the suspect shares these features except his chin is
receding, not protruding, and he is 32 years old.283 In this situation, the
APLS paper recommends that the fillers should be "white males,
around 32 years old in appearance with slightly receding chins, dark
hair, around 165 pounds, and around 5'9" tall. 28 4
Finally, the New Jersey guidelines suggest that when conducting
more than one lineup due having multiple witnesses, the administrator
should "consider placing the suspect in different positions in each

274.
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lineup," hence, using all the same people, just placing them in different
places. 285 This recommendation fails to recognize the risk of
"correlated error., 286 Researchers have suggested that when there are
multiple witnesses, separate lineups should be constructed for each
witness.287 Specifically, each lineup should consist of the same
suspects, but should include different foils. The reason for this
recommendation is that if the lineup is biased in a way to make the
suspect stand out, it is likely that each witness will choose the
suspect.2 88 If each eyewitness chooses the same suspect, it may appear
that the identification is highly accurate, when in reality the witnesses
may have selected the same suspect because the lineup was biased.289
The APLS paper recognizes that constructing a new lineup for
each eyewitness is an "expensive and labor intensive exercise.,' 290 This
may be the reason New Jersey opted for the less burdensome
alternative of simply moving the suspect to a new position for each
lineup. However, moving the suspect will not prevent "correlated
error."
3. Recordinga Confidence Statement Priorto Giving the
Witness Feedback
The New Jersey guidelines suggest that in all photo and live
lineups, the administrator should avoid "reporting to the witness any
information regarding the individual he or she has selected prior to
obtaining the witness' statement of certainty., 29 1 This recommendation
seems to adequately meet the researchers' recommendations. Taking a
confidence statement before the administrator gives the eyewitness any
feedback serves the important purpose of ensuring that the eyewitness'
292
confidence is not inflated by post-identification information.
4.

The Lineup AdministratorShould not Know the Identity of the'
Suspect

The New Jersey guidelines suggest that "whenever practical," live
or photo lineups should be conducted by someone other than the
primary investigator in the case.293 The guidelines continue by
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
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suggesting that if the primary investigator does conduct the lineup, he
or she should be careful not to inadvertently alert the eyewitness to the
"correct" response. 294 The problem with this recommendation is its
optional nature. If the primary investigator on a case does not want to
go to the trouble of finding another officer to conduct a lineup, he or
she can simply say it was not practical. In essence, it is likely that this
procedure will not be followed.
Further, when the primary investigator does conduct the lineup,
the guidelines suggest that he or she should simply be careful not to
make inadvertent signals.2 95 It is true that preventing inadvertent
signals is critical, but simply advising prevention is not practical. A
lineup administrator is likely to influence an eyewitness even though
such influence is not conscious or deliberate.296 The APLS paper
reports that it is well established that "people have natural propensities
to test a hypothesis in ways that tend to bias the evidence toward
confirming the hypothesis., 297 Studies have demonstrated that using
some of the simplest body language can cause an individual to believe
you are signaling them to make a certain choice.2 98 Moreover, the
interaction between the lineup administrator and the eyewitness is
extremely interpersonal.299 When the eyewitness and the administrator
assume close physical distance, it is easy to maintain eye contact, make
inadvertent facial expressions, or even possibly conduct verbal
exchange. 300 All of these dangers, coupled with the eyewitness' desire
to do his part in the investigation, suggest that having the primary
investigator conduct the lineup may have dangerous consequences.
5.

Mock Witnesses Should be Used to Test the Neutrality of the
Lineup

The New Jersey procedures suggest that when compiling a photo
lineup, the administrator should "view the array, once completed, to
ensure that the suspect does not unduly stand out.' 301 An equivalent
recommendation is not made for live lineups. 30 2 However, this is
probably not the most effective way to test whether a lineup is biased.
Researchers have suggested testing the neutrality of a lineup by using a
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
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"mock witness" procedure in which witnesses who have never seen the
culprit are given the eyewitness' initial description of the culprit and
then asked to select the person who they think is the culprit from the
lineup.30 3 If the lineup is not biased, the mock witness should not be
able to select the suspect at a level that "exceeds chance expectations
based on the number of choices (number of lineup members) that could
have been selected., 314 If it is simple for a mock witness to figure out
who the suspect is under these circumstances, "a concern is raised
about whether an eyewitness' selection was a product of true
recognition memory or was due merely
to the same deduction process
30 5
that mock witnesses apparently used.,
The absence of the "mock witness" procedure from the New
Jersey guidelines is probably once again due to the high cost of putting
together a group of mock witnesses every time there is a lineup.
6. Sequential Rather than Simultaneous Lineups Should be Used
New Jersey does not require the exclusive use of sequential
lineups, rather the guidelines suggest that sequential lineups should be
used "when possible. 30 6 Research has shown that "any procedure that
could prevent relative-judgment processes and encourage absolute
30 7
judgments should reduce the likelihood of false identifications.,
Research has demonstrated that the sequential lineup procedure may
force eyewitnesses to rely on absolute as opposed to relative
judgment,
30 8
thereby reducing the likelihood of false identifications.
It is unfortunate that the New Jersey guidelines leave law
enforcement personnel with the option of using the simultaneous lineup
procedure, when tests of the sequential lineup alternative have shown
that it produces a lower rate of false identification "with little or no
decrease in rates of accurate identification. 30 9
Review of New Jersey's guidelines, in light of currently available
research outlined in Part II of this comment, indicates that these
guidelines have not flawlessly incorporated the current scientific
research. This will likely continue to be a problem if other states or
local agencies follow New Jersey's lead and adopt similar guidelines.
The result will be over 100 sets of very different guidelines, each with
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their own problems, which will take time to identify and more time to
change. To solve the problem most efficiently, a uniform set of
national guidelines is needed.
V.

PROPOSAL

The problems with a state-by-state approach point to a broader
solution-the adoption of mandatory, uniform, nationwide standards.
Such a broad set of standards would be most effectively implemented
through a U.S. Supreme Court decision. Although this may seem like a
proposal that is unlikely to take effect, it is not unprecedented. In the
1960s, the Court was seeking means to handle an analogous situationthe regulation of the problematic police practices used to obtain
incriminating statements from criminal suspects. To handle that
problem, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a list of safeguards
to be
310
followed in the now famous decision, Miranda v. Arizona.
The Supreme Court should adopt a short list of guidelines similar
to those adopted by New Jersey, with a few minor changes. First, the
witness should be instructed prior to the lineup that the perpetrator may
or may not be present, and that they should not feel pressured to make
an identification. 311 Second, the composition of the line-up should not
cause a suspect to unduly stand out, meaning the features of the suspect
and the foils should not be completely uniform or completely
distinct. 312 Third, foils in the lineup should be chosen to fit the
eyewitness's initial description of the culprit, rather than to resemble
the suspect.313 When the eyewitness' initial description of the culprit
does not match the appearance of the police suspect, foils should match
the witness' description of the culprit. 31 4 However, when there are
specific differences between the witness' description and the suspect's
31 5
appearance, the suspect's appearance should control for that feature.
Next, when there is more than one witness, a different lineup should be
316
created for each witness, with only the suspect remaining the same.
The administrator should not report any information to the witness
regarding the individual he or she has selected prior to obtaining a
statement of the witness' confidence in his or her identification. 317 In
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addition, lineups should always be conducted by someone unconnected
to the case, who does not know the identity of the suspect.318 Mock
witnesses should be used to test the neutrality of each lineup 319 and
blank lineups should always be used.32 ° Sequential lineups should also
always be used3 2 1 and lineups should always be videotaped.322
Adopting Miranda-like rules of procedure for composing and
conducting lineups, similar to those above, would result in a set of
guidelines that are uniform and compulsory. However, the guidelines
should not stifle other efforts to come to a workable solution. In
Miranda,323 the Court warned, "our decision in no way creates a
constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts at
reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. 3 24 The Court continued
by stating that until procedures are developed and proven effective, the
procedures articulated by the Court "must be observed., 325 A similar
caveat should be included if the Supreme Court adopts lineup
guidelines. Allowing states to continue developing their own solutions
to the problem would not stifle the great strides made by states like
New Jersey. However, there would not be the problem of various
states choosing to incorporate some guidelines and not others due to
politics, disagreement, or other pressures. The Supreme Court should
adopt a nationwide set of rules with the intention that they are a floor,
not a ceiling.
Uniform nationwide guidelines would likely have an impact on
the amount of erroneous eyewitness evidence because the guidelines
would help attorneys identify and object to faulty identification
procedures. Although suspects currently have the right to have an
326
attorney present at lineups under certain limited circumstances,
research has shown that this is not necessarily an effective safeguard.32 7
The reason the presence of counsel may not be effective is because an
attorney must understand the biases that exist in lineups before he or
she is able 8to identify the problem and persuasively argue a motion to
32
suppress.
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However, attorneys are not the only people who should
understand the problems with eyewitness evidence. With over 77,000
people becoming defendants based on eyewitness identification each
year, 329 there are also well over this number of eyewitnesses making
identifications each year. When making identifications eyewitnesses
probably do not fully understand the different variables that are
influencing their decisions. If people understood the problems with
eyewitness identification evidence, they would be more conscious of
the process and in turn would become better eyewitnesses, jurors,
judges, and attorneys.
A critical look at the problems with eyewitness identification
evidence should be included in the curriculum of certain high school
and college classes. For example, a class on the human mind as it
relates to erroneous eyewitness identification would be simple to
incorporate into the curriculum of an already required college
psychology or sociology course. The 2000 census reports that "the
high school completion level of young adults ages 25-29 was 88%,
while college completion level was 29%.,,33o
These statistics
demonstrate that instituting this curriculum at the college level would
miss a significant portion of society. Therefore, material on eyewitness
identification should also be instituted at the high school level. It
seems logical to include such material in a course in civics. Students in
high school civics courses should understand not only the structure and
operation of governmental agencies but should learn how to take a
critical look at the system and its problems. These students will
become the eyewitnesses, judges, jurors, and attorneys that have the
ability to make substantive change.
If attorneys in particular are aware of the causes of mistaken
eyewitness evidence, perhaps they will more frequently challenge
lineup procedures as a violation of due process. Eventually, the
Supreme Court may take notice and promulgate the guidelines that are
so desperately needed to minimize the prevalence of wrongful
convictions that are the result of mistaken eyewitness identifications.
VI. CONCLUSION
Errors in eyewitness identification are the leading cause of

329. See Wells et al., supra note 12, at 609.
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(March
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Jan. 19, 2002).
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wrongful convictions in the United States.331 Research has revealed
many reasons why eyewitness evidence is often unreliable.33 2 Most of
the factors contributing to the unreliability of such evidence are
controllable by the criminal justice system.333 The key to fixing this
problem is finding the334best way to put social science research into law
enforcement practice.
A state-by-state approach to adopting guidelines is problematic
primarily because most police departments are under local control, not
statewide control.335 If each state or locality adopts its own, slightly
different guidelines, there will be hundreds of different guidelines, each
plagued with their own problems. 336 A more efficient way to put social
science findings into law enforcement practice would be for the U.S.
standards, similar to
Supreme Court to adopt nationwide, mandatory
337
Arizona.
v.
Miranda
in
promulgated
those
Mandatory national guidelines modeled on the recommendations
of social science researchers, coupled with education, will help
attorneys identify and challenge biased lineups and will help make
More importantly, these
eyewitness evidence more reliable. 338
recommendations are likely to reduce the rate of wrongful conviction
in this country.
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